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Abstract Alexander Bird indicates that the significance of Thomas Kuhn in the his-
tory of philosophy of science is somehow paradoxical. On the one hand, Kuhn was
one of the most influential and important philosophers of science in the second half of
the twentieth century. On the other hand, nowadays there is little distinctively Kuhn’s
legacy in the sense that most of Kuhn’s work has no longer any philosophical signifi-
cance. Bird argues that the explanation of the paradox of Kuhn’s legacy is that Kuhn
took a direction opposite to that of the mainstream of the philosophy of science in his
later academic career. This paper aims to provide a new way to understand and develop
Kuhn’s legacy by revisiting the development of Kuhn’s philosophy of science in 1970s
and proposing a new account of exemplar. Firstly, I propose my diagnosis of Kuhn’s
“wrong turning” by identifying Kuhn’s two novel contributions: the introduction of
paradigm and the proposal of the incommensurability thesis. Secondly, I argue that
Kuhn made a conceptual/terminological turn from paradigm to theory, which under-
mined Kuhn’s novel contributions. Thirdly, I propose a new articulation of exemplar
and propose an exemplar-based approach to analysing the history of science. Finally,
I show how the exemplar-based approach can be applied to analyse the history of
science by my case study of the early development of genetics.
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1 Introduction: Bird on the paradox of Kuhn’s legacy
Alexander Bird (2002) indicates that the significance of Thomas Kuhn in the history
of philosophy of science is somehow paradoxical. On the one hand, Kuhn was one
of the most influential and important philosophers of science in the second half of
the twentieth century. On the other hand, nowadays there is little distinctively Kuhn’s
legacy in the sense that most of Kuhn’s work has no longer any philosophical signifi-
cance.1 Bird argues that the explanation of the paradox of Kuhn’s legacy is that Kuhn
took a direction opposite to that of the mainstream of the philosophy of science in
his later academic career. From Bird’s point of view, since the 1970s, more and more
philosophers became sympathetic to a naturalistic approach to philosophical issues,
whereas Kuhn took a more a priori approach. This is what Bird called Kuhn’s wrong
turning. A consequence of this methodological turn is that Kuhn failed to articulate and
explore the concept of paradigm as exemplar in a naturalistic approach. Bird (2002,
2005, 2008) also proposes a naturalised account of the incommensurability thesis and
argues that it is more promising and plausible than Kuhn’s late versions of incommen-
surability (1989, 1990, 1993, 2000a, b). To sum up, Bird argues the success of Kuhn’s
(1962) book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) is due to his naturalised
account of the history and practice of science in terms of paradigms. (In particular,
Kuhn uses empirical evidence to argue for the theory-dependence of observation.) So
it is not surprising that Kuhn’s late work with a less naturalistic approach leaves little
impact on contemporary philosophy of science. This is why Bird argues that Kuhn’s
methodological turn in the 1970s explains the paradox of Kuhn’s legacy.
But why did Kuhn make such a methodological turn? Bird provides two further
explanations. Firstly, the machinery that Kuhn needed to further develop the incom-
mensurability thesis was not available to him. In Bird’s words, “the central idea of
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was before its time in an important respect.”
(Bird 2002, p. 444) Secondly, though Kuhn was strongly inclined to be a philosopher,
he had little philosophical training and was unaware of the naturalistic turn in the
philosophical world in his time.
Thus, Bird’s argument can be reformulated as follows:
P1. Kuhn’s most important contribution is his naturalistic account of the history of
science in SSR in terms of paradigm.
P2. Kuhn made a methodological turn in the 1970s, namely from a naturalistic approach
to an a priori approach.
P3. Kuhn’s methodological turn makes him fail to articulate and explore the concept
of paradigm in a naturalistic way.
C. Therefore, Kuhn’s most important contribution is undermined by his methodolog-
ical turn. Thus, Kuhn’s legacy is really thin today.
1 It should be noted that Bird’s claim is not that there is an apparently lacking influence of Kuhn’s work
in contemporary philosophy of science. Rather what Bird explicitly means is that “there is no specifically
Kuhnian school in the philosophy of science. Nor is Kuhn’s most characteristic thesis—the thesis of incom-
mensurability—regarded any longer as having the philosophical significance that Kuhn claimed for it” (Bird
2002, pp. 443–444).
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I agree with Bird on the point that Kuhn made some “wrong turning” in the sense it
prevents his work becoming more promising and better received.2 I also agree that
Kuhn made a methodological turn in the 1970s, and Bird’s naturalised account of the
incommensurability thesis is more promising than Kuhn’s late versions of incommen-
surability. However, I find Bird’s diagnosis still incomplete. Firstly, Kuhn’s “wrong
turning” is more than methodological. As Bird points out, in the presidential address
to the Philosophy of Science Association in 1990, Kuhn made no mention at all of
paradigms, which was his major contribution in SSR. In fact, as I shall argue in Sect. 3,
Kuhn has been deliberately avoiding talking of paradigm since 1970s. Thus, there is
also a conceptual/terminological turn in Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Secondly, even
if Bird’s attempt to naturalise the incommensurability thesis is promising, I contend
that it is not the only way to develop Kuhn’s work to contribute to contemporary
philosophy of science. In this paper, I aim to provide a new way to understand and
develop Kuhn’s legacy by revisiting the development of Kuhn’s philosophy of science
in 1970s and proposing a new account of exemplar.
My strategy of analysing Kuhn’s “wrong” turning will be centrally concerned with
Kuhn’s novel contributions. I shall examine what makes Kuhn’s early philosophy of
science so revolutionary and influential. In other words, what are the novel contri-
butions made by early Kuhn which might be Kuhn’s legacy for today? Secondly, I
shall identify the obstacles to the further articulation of Kuhn’s novel contributions:
Why are these “revolutionary and influential” parts of Kuhn’s philosophy left with-
out substantial or lasting impact on contemporary philosophy of science? In Sect. 2, I
shall propose my own diagnosis by identifying that Kuhn’s two novel contributions. In
Sect. 3, I shall argue that Kuhn made a conceptual/terminological turn from paradigm
to theory, which undermined Kuhn’s novel contributions. In Sect. 4, I shall propose a
new articulation of exemplar and propose an exemplar-based approach to analysing
the history and practice of science. In Sect. 5, I shall show how the exemplar-based
approach can be applied to account for the early development of genetics.
2 Kuhn’s novel contributions
In this section, I shall argue that Kuhn made two major novel contributions in SSR.
Along with Bird, I contend that Kuhn’s introduction of the concept of paradigm (as an
alternative to theory to characterise the history and practice of science) in SSR is his
most novel and significant contributions to the philosophy of science (1962, 1970).
It is a novel move in the history of philosophy of science in two senses. Firstly, it is
really novel to analyse and understand the history and practice of science in terms of
paradigms. Traditionally, without argument, philosophers (e.g. Popper 1959; Nagel
1961; Suppe 1977) analyse scientific knowledge and the history of science in terms of
theories. Theories are taken for granted as the typical unit to represent an episode of
2 It should be highlighted that I am sympathetic to Bird’s view that Kuhn made a “wrong turning”, but I
only accept a weaker version of the paradox of Kuhn’s legacy. The crucial difference is that Bird is explicit
on the point that Kuhn’s “wrong turning” made his legacy in the philosophy of science today extraordinarily
thin, while I contend that without Kuhn’s “wrong turning”, his work would have been more promising and
better received.
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the history of science. For example, the Copernican revolution was widely construed
as a theory-change from the Ptolemaic theory to the Copernican theory. It is Kuhn
who first made philosophers seriously reconsider the legitimacy of the application of
theory as the unit of analysis in the philosophical examination of the history of science.
Kuhn (1970, p. 182) insightfully points out that the unit of analysis in philosophising
the history of science should be a broader unit, i.e. what is shared by a scientific
community, rather than a single scientific theory, which “connotes a structure far more
limited in nature and scope than the one required”.
Accordingly, Kuhn suggests that the history of a science is a cyclic process alternat-
ing the period of normal science, in which most scientists work under one dominating
paradigm, with the period of scientific revolution, in which there are multiple com-
peting paradigms. In the period of normal science, scientists’ main task is to solve
puzzles or problems of the accepted paradigm. Sometimes a paradigm falls into a
state of crisis due to some internal and external factors when the scientists begin to
lose their confidence in the ability and effectiveness of the paradigm’s puzzle-solving
machinery. For Kuhn (1970, p. 181), a crisis is “the usual prelude” to a scientific revo-
lution, or paradigm-shift. In the period of scientific revolution, there is no universally
accepted paradigm in the community of scientists. Multiple paradigms compete with
each other until the establishment of a new period of normal science when one of the
competing paradigms wins the support of the majority and most scientists again work
together to solve its puzzles.
Since the publication of SSR, many alternative units of analysis have been pro-
posed inspired by Kuhn’s paradigm. Lakatos’ research programme (1968),3 Laudan’s
research tradition (1977),4 and Darden and Maull’s field (1977)5 are among the most
famous ones. Thus, it is not difficult to see how Kuhn’s novel proposal of the con-
ception of paradigm revolutionised the philosophical analysis of scientific knowledge
and the history of science in the 1960s and 1970s.
Some may challenge the view that Kuhn’s concept of paradigm is really novel.
For example, Ludwik Fleck (1935) introduced a similar community-based concept,
thought style, to analyse the history of science, and Kuhn himself (1979) also acknowl-
3 Lakatos is explicit on the point that his “research programme” is a reconstruction of “paradigm” in his
defence of Popperian philosophy of science against Kuhn’s challenge: “Indeed, my concept of a ’research-
programme’ may be construed as an objective, ‘third-world’ reconstruction of Kuhn’s concept of ’paradigm’:
thus the Kuhnian ’Gestalt-switch’ can be performed without removing one’s Popperian spectacles” (Lakatos
1968, p. 182n87).
4 Laudan’s conception of research tradition is an alternative to Kuhn’s paradigm and Lakatos’ research
programme as the unit of analysis in the history of science: “[I]t has been suggested by Kuhn and Lakatos
that the more general theories, rather than the more specific ones, are the primary tool for understanding
and appraising scientific progress… I share this conviction in principle, but find that accounts hitherto
given of what these larger theories are, and how they evolve, are not fully satisfactory… [T]his chapter
will be devoted to outlining a new account of the more global theories (which I shall be calling research
traditions)” (Laudan 1977, p. 72).
5 Although Darden and Maull’s conception of field is also influenced by Stephen Toulmin’s conception
of discipline (1972), it follows the trend in the philosophy of science at that time to adopt a broader unit
of analysis, led by Kuhn and Lakatos: “Other current broader categories include Imre Lakatos’s ‘research
programme,’ … and Thomas Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ or ‘disciplinary matrix’…” (Darden and Maull 1977, p.
45n5).
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edged that he knew Fleck’s work before SSR. It has been debated (e.g. Babich 2003;
Knoblauch 2010) to what extent Kuhn’s paradigm may have been influenced by
Fleck’s thought style or thought collective. Despite the similarity between paradigm
and thought style, I still contend that Kuhn’s introduction of the concept of paradigm is
a novel contribution to the philosophy of science in the 1960s. Nicola Mößner (2011)
has already shown that there are substantial differences between Kuhn’s paradigm
and Fleck’s thought style. In addition, I would like to highlight that it is novel for
Kuhn to distinguish two senses of paradigm:6 paradigms as disciplinary matrices, and
paradigms as exemplars. The broad sense of paradigm, also called disciplinary matrix,
is a consensus among a community of scientists, which consists of symbolic generali-
sations,7 values,8 models,9 and exemplars. The narrow sense of paradigm, also called
exemplar (an essential constituent of the disciplinary matrix), refers to a problem solu-
tion. Such a distinction is Kuhn’s attempt to articulate the nature and structure of a
paradigm. In particular, the narrow sense of paradigm is really novel in the sense that
by introducing “exemplar”, Kuhn tries to emphasise the significance of the problem-
solving, problem–solution learning, analogical reasoning, and tacit knowledge in the
practice of science. All these were overlooked by most philosophers of science in
the 1960s.10 Even Kuhn (1970, p. 187) himself explicitly identifies “paradigm as
exemplar” as the most novel aspect of SSR. This narrow sense of paradigm and its
philosophical implication is absent from Fleck’s conception of thought style. There-
fore, the introduction of the concept of paradigm as a new unit of analysis to examine
the history and practice of science is Kuhn’s one significant novel contribution.
In addition, the incommensurability thesis11 is Kuhn’s other novel contribution
to the twentieth century’s philosophy of science. The basic idea of the incommen-
surability thesis is that there is a difficulty of comparing two successive paradigms
as disciplinary matrices in the paradigm-shift.12 The shift from one paradigm from
6 It should be noted that this distinction was not a novel idea in the first place (i.e. the first edition of SSR),
but was introduced in the postscript of the second edition of SSR as a response to the criticism that there
were too many different senses of paradigm. Nevertheless, it does not undermine the novelty of Kuhn’s
distinction between paradigm as disciplinary matrix and paradigm as exemplar.
7 Symbolic generalisations are symbolic expressions of scientific hypotheses, which can be manipulated
mathematically. Newton’s second law (i.e. F  ma) is such a case.
8 The values of a disciplinary matrix, which are shared by the members under it, include accuracy, consis-
tency, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and so on.
9 Models, for Kuhn (1970, p. 184), designate two different classes. On the one hand, models include “the
metaphysical commitments” or “ontological models” like the belief that the heat of a body is the kinetic
energy of its constituent particles. On the other hand, models also encompass the “heuristic models and
analogies” in accordance with which phenomena from a given class may be treated as if they were something
else entirely. Take an example from Mendelian genetics: Genes carried on chromosomes can be understood
as beads strung on a wire.
10 Michael Polanyi’s book (1966) is an exception.
11 The claim that the incommensurability thesis is Kuhn’s novel contribution seems controversial to some.
In the same year when the first edition of SSR was published, Paul Feyerabend (1962) proposed his thesis of
incommensurability. Fleck (1927, 1939) talked of the incommensurability of concepts or ideas even earlier.
However, it is novel to formulate the incommensurability thesis in terms of paradigm. It is in this sense that
the (paradigm-based) incommensurability thesis is Kuhn’s another novel contribution.
12 It should be noted that Kuhn is very explicit on the point that incommensurability does not imply
incomparability.
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another cannot be simply explained by some universal standard of rationality (e.g.
Popper’s falsifiability criterion). In the 1960s, Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis pro-
vided an alternative way to understand and analyse scientific progress and scientific
change. Furthermore, it highlighted the discontinuity of the history of science and
the complexity of the practice of science. Traditional philosophical understandings
of scientific change and rationality (e.g. the conventional progressive account and
Popper’s falsificationist account) were seriously challenged by Kuhn’s incommensu-
rability thesis. Thus, I argue that this is another major novelty made by Kuhn in the
1960s.
Of course, it can be argued that Kuhn’s novel contributions are more than these.
For example, some may argue that Kuhn’s real novel contribution is to argue that the
history of science is discontinuous, while other may identify Kuhn’s contribution as
the identification of the social factor in the practice of science. But I contend all these
contributions are dependent on the conceptions of paradigm and incommensurability.
3 Kuhn’s conceptual/terminological turn and “wrong turning”
However, Kuhn’s novel contributions, as Bird argues, are not as well developed as
expected. Neither paradigm as exemplar nor paradigm as disciplinary matrix has been
seriously articulated further. Nor has an exemplar-based account of scientific change or
history of science explored with a detailed historical case. Kuhn’s later interpretations
of incommensurability are poorly received. Why has the significance of what Kuhn
achieved in SSR not been fully recognised? Before answering this question, I shall
point out that there is a peculiar phenomenon. After the 1970s, Kuhn (1977), like other
philosophers at that time, began conflating “theory” with “paradigm”, and he ended up
never using “paradigm” (e.g. Kuhn 1982, 1983, 1987). In particular, after 1970 Kuhn
seldom used the concept of paradigm or exemplar to analyse the history of science
and scientific change.13 It is surprising that Kuhn, who once strongly opposed the use
of the concept “theory” to analyse the practice and history of science (Kuhn 1962,
1970), ignored the substantial difference between paradigm and theory identified by
himself. It is also extraordinary that neither paradigm as exemplar as “the central
element of what [I] now [take] to be the most novel and least understood aspect
of [SSR]” (Kuhn 1970, p. 187), nor paradigm as disciplinary matrix as “the one
that [I believe] most urgently needs philosophical attention” (Kuhn 1974, p. 460)
has never been further articulated, or even mentioned again, even by himself, since
1974. Instead, Kuhn begins examining the history and practice of science in terms
of theory. Kuhn articulates the characteristics of a good “theory” rather than a good
paradigm (1977), talks of “theory-choice” rather than “paradigm-choice” (1983), and
reinterprets the incommensurability thesis in terms of theory (1989). Thus, I argue that
this conceptual/terminological turn (from paradigm to theory) is another important
change in Kuhn’s philosophy of science, in addition to the methodological turn. Note
13 It should be noted that Kuhn’s “Second thoughts on paradigm” was not a post-1970 work, since it was
written for the 1969 Illinois Symposium on the structure of scientific theories, although it was published
for the first time in the conference volume edited by Suppe in 1974.
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that the conceptual/terminological turn is much more than a linguistic issue. It impedes
the further development of the concept of paradigm, and thus undermines Kuhn’s
contribution as the proposal of the concept of paradigm.
Moreover, I shall argue that Kuhn’s conceptual/terminological turn also indi-
rectly leads to undermine other contribution of his, namely the introduction of
the incommensurability thesis. Initially, Kuhn (1962) implicitly characterised the
incommensurability thesis in three ways, namely methodological, semantic, and cog-
nitive.14 However, since 1970, Kuhn began focusing on the semantic aspect of the
incommensurability thesis. He attempted to interpret incommensurability in terms
of untranslatability, non-overlapping lexicons, and so on. As Kuhn (1982, p. 684n3)
admitted, “I would no longer [speak of the methodological incommensurability]15
except to the considerable extent that the [methodological aspect of incommensura-
bility is a] necessary consequence of the language-learning process”. However, this
move is characterised as the “journey up [a] dead end” by Bird (2002, p. 463). I shall
argue that Kuhn’s conceptual/terminological turn underlies this move. As Kuhn made
the conceptual/terminological turn from paradigm to theory, he began analysing the
history and practice of science in terms of theory. Thus, the incommensurability thesis
immediately becomes narrowly scoped. If the incommensurability thesis were to be
articulated in terms of paradigm as disciplinary matrix, it would be analysed by exam-
ining the differences in the symbolic generalisations, models, values, and exemplars. If
the incommensurability thesis were to be articulated in terms of paradigm as exemplar,
it would be analysed by examining the differences in the problems to be investigated
and the corresponding solutions. Either way it seems promising to investigate all of
the methodological, semantic, and cognitive aspects of the incommensurability thesis.
However, if the incommensurability thesis were to be articulated in terms of theory as
Kuhn did, it would be difficult to see how two theories could be compared method-
ologically or cognitively. The only aspect that matters here is the semantic one. So, it
is not surprising that Kuhn shifted his focus onto semantic incommensurability from
the 1970s. It is a natural consequence of his conceptual/terminological turn. In short,
because Kuhn did not talk of paradigm, nor articulate the concept paradigm, it seems
natural for him to shift his attention to the semantic aspect of incommensurability, and
prevents him from developing the methodological or cognitive aspects further. There-
fore, the incommensurability thesis became less fruitful and promising as a result of
Kuhn’s conceptual/terminological turn. Bird’s naturalised account of incommensura-
bility (2002, 2005, 2008) has already successfully showed how the cognitive aspect
of the incommensurability thesis can be developed in terms of exemplar rather than
theory.
Thus, my explanation of the paradox of Kuhn’s legacy is as follows.
(a) Kuhn’s two major novel contributions to the twentieth-century philosophy of
science are (1) the introduction of the concept of paradigm as an alternative to
14 Kuhn never used the phrases “methodological incommensurability”, “semantic incommensurability”, or
“cognitive/perceptual incommensurability”. For a fuller articulation of the three aspects of Kuhn’s incom-
mensurability thesis, see Sankey (1993, 1994).
15 Kuhn’s original expression in the text is “differences in method, problem-field, and standards of solution”
(Kuhn 1982, p. 684n3).
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theory to analyse the practice and history of science; (2) and the proposal of the
incommensurability thesis as a new account of scientific change.
(b) Kuhn made a conceptual/terminological turn in the 1970s, which withdrew his
novel contribution (1).
(c) Kuhn’s conceptual/terminological turn underlies his focussing attention upon
the semantic incommensurability, to the detriment of the methodological and
cognitive aspects.
(d) From (b) and (c), we can conclude that it is Kuhn’s failure to explore and articulate
his novel concept of paradigm as exemplar that makes the incommensurability
thesis less fruitful and plausible, which means that his novel contribution (2) is
undermined.
(e) Therefore, from (b) and (d), Kuhn’s failure to explore and articulate his novel
concept of paradigm as exemplar well explains the paradox of Kuhn’s legacy.
It should be noted that Bird (2002, p. 461, 2005, p. 114) seems to recognise Kuhn’s
conceptual/terminological turn. However, Bird fails to appreciate its significance fully.
On the one hand, the conceptual/terminological turn is just implicitly mentioned in
Bird’s analysis. It is in this sense that I find Bird’s diagnosis incomplete. On the
other hand, Bird regards the conceptual/terminological turn as a consequence of the
methodological turn. In contrast, I argue that even if the conceptual/terminological
turn does not necessarily imply the methodological turn, the former is at least as
fundamental as the latter. They are mutually connected and together consist in Kuhn’s
“wrong turning” in the 1970s.
4 A new interpretation of exemplar and the exemplar-based approach
Although both Bird and I argue that Kuhn’s failure of exploring and articulating his
novel concept of paradigm as exemplar is key to the explanation of the paradox of
Kuhn’s legacy, there is a crucial difference between Bird’s and my diagnosis. For Bird,
the nature of Kuhn’s wrong turning is methodological, while I insist that it is much more
complicated. Firstly, though I agree with Bird on the point that there was a method-
ological turn in Kuhn’s philosophy of science, it was not the only change. Even Bird
(2002, p. 461) also admits that Kuhn shifted his philosophical focus from a paradigm-
based account of history of science to the reinterpretation of the incommensurability
thesis. However, Bird argues that this focus-shift is a result of Kuhn’s methodolog-
ical turn, while I argue that Kuhn’s methodological turn, conceptual/terminological
turn, and focus-shift are mutually influenced in a complex way. To some extent it
can also be argued that Kuhn’s methodological turn, conceptual/terminological turn,
and focus-shift reflect the different aspects of a deeper shift in Kuhn’s philosophy of
science since the 1970s.
Secondly, though I also agree with Bird on the point that Kuhn’s early naturalistic
approach is significant and promising, I think that it is not the only significant and
promising element in SSR. Nor am I convinced that a naturalistic approach to exemplar
and incommensurability thesis is the only promising way to develop the concept of
exemplar and the incommensurability thesis. In contrast, Kuhn’s incommensurability
thesis can be developed pluralistically, as his original version suggests. Chang (2012),
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for example, develops a methodological incommensurability thesis to illustrate the
chemical revolution.
Moreover, I shall argue that there are many other aspects of Kuhn’s conception
of exemplar to be explored. For example, though it is never explicitly stated, Kuhn’s
concept of paradigm suggests a practice-oriented philosophy of science, which is
eventually echoed by the recent practical turn in philosophy of science. For many
philosophers (e.g. Chang 2014, p. 67; Soler et al. 2014, pp. 21–22; Waters 2014,
p. 121; Giere 2011, p. 61), the central issue in contemporary philosophy of science
should and has gradually shifted from what scientists find out to how scientists find
out, and from scientific (theoretical) knowledge to scientific practice. Kuhn’s very
first definition of paradigm was practice-oriented (1970, p. 10): paradigms are “some
accepted examples of actual scientific practice—examples which include law, theory,
application, and instrumentation together—[which] provide models from which spring
particular coherent traditions of scientific research.” In addition, the practice-oriented
implication of Kuhn’s philosophy is also reflected in his emphasis on the significance
of the activities of puzzle-solving in the history of science. Some (e.g. Nickles 2003;
Rouse 2003) have already recognised the significance of the practical aspect of exem-
plar. For instance, as Joseph Rouse (2003, p. 107) suggests, paradigms as exemplars
can be understood as “exemplary ways of conceptualizing and intervening in partic-
ular situations.” Thus, along with Rouse, I argue that a more rigorous practice-based
articulation of exemplar will contribute to the ongoing movement termed philosophy
of science in practice. More specifically, I contend that a better articulation of exemplar
will provide a useful tool to analyse the history and practice of science. In the rest of
this section, I will propose a new interpretation of exemplar and correspondingly an
exemplar-based approach to analysing the development of scientific practice.
For Kuhn, exemplars as problem–solutions play an indispensable role in the prac-
tice of puzzle-solving. It is Kuhn’s novel contribution to introduce the significance
of puzzle-solving in the scientific practice into the philosophy of science community.
However, Kuhn’s concept of exemplar still lacks a fuller articulation. In other words,
Kuhn’s own definition of exemplar is too thin and premature. Many significant prob-
lems concerning exemplars are yet to be explored. Firstly, Kuhn says little on how an
exemplar is first established or constructed further. As Thomas Nickles (2012, p. 120)
asks, “Where do [exemplars] initially come from?”16 Although Kuhn is famous for his
rejection of the sharp distinction between the context of discovery and of justification
and accusing philosophers of ignoring the “temporal development of a theory”, Kuhn
does not provide a sophisticated account of the construction and temporal development
of an exemplar. Secondly, in his elaboration, Kuhn’s exemplar is simply exemplified
by the examples in the textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises. These examples
are helpful to provide a rough idea of the application of the exemplars. However, the
constituents of an exemplar are never explicitly explicated. Nor is a historical example
16 However, Nickles (2012) still pays insufficient attention to articulate the process of the construction of
an exemplar.
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of an exemplar articulated in an explicit way.17 Thirdly, Kuhn’s exemplar (as a prob-
lem–solution) implicitly assumes some pre-existing problems. But where are these
pre-existing problems from? Although Kuhn (1970, p. 103) contends that the shift of
accepted exemplars in a scientific revolution necessitates the redefinition of research
problems, he says little on how the research problems are defined or redefined. Nor
is it clear whether problem-defining is a task involving the construction of an exem-
plar. The significance of problem-defining seems not to be fully recognised by Kuhn.
Fourthly, Kuhn fails to explore the characteristics of a good exemplar.18 It is unclear
what makes some exemplars successfully accepted, while others neglected or aban-
doned.19 Fifthly, Kuhn is implicit on how an exemplar is or the constituents of an
exemplar are used or applied to guide the subsequent research, including constructing
a new exemplar, proposing new research problems, solving other problems.
To sum up, Kuhn’s definition of exemplar is not well articulated mainly in five
ways:
1. The construction of an exemplar is unclear;
2. The constituents of an exemplar are unclear;
3. No detailed historical example of an exemplar is illustrated;
4. What makes an exemplar successfully received is unclear;
5. How an exemplar guides the subsequent research is not explicitly analysed.
Correspondingly, a good reinterpretation of exemplar has to
1′. explicate how an exemplar is constructed;
2′. identify the constituents of an exemplar;
3′. be instantiated by a detailed historical case-study;
4′. explore the characteristics of a successfully accepted exemplar;
5′. explain how the exemplar can guide subsequent research.
In other words, I not only have to tell what an exemplar is, what the components of
an exemplar are, but also to explore how an exemplar is constructed, how an episode
of the history of science can be characterised in terms of exemplars. Moreover, I shall
discuss what the characteristics of a good exemplar are, which make it successfully
accepted, and examine the instructive function of an exemplar.
I have argued that one advantage of a Kuhnian exemplar-based account of the
history of science is that the significance of the problem–solution in the history and
practice of science is well articulated and highlighted. Many of the scientific prac-
tices in history are oriented or inspired by some past successful problem–solutions.
Kuhn’s account of puzzle-solving does capture the “essence” of many, though not
17 There are a few attempts to employ the notion of exemplar to analyse some history cases. For example,
Darden (1991) analyses the explanatory virtue of the hybrid crossing in terms of exemplar, while Skopek
(2011) explores the pedagogical virtue of Mendel’s work on peas in terms of exemplar. Unfortunately, the
exemplars, for both Darden and Skopek, are simply construed as the examples in the textbook.
18 NIckles (2012, p. 128) asks a similar question: “What makes something an exemplar, a problem-cum-
solution of the sort that is selected for inclusion in a textbook, widely cited by experts in the field, or the
design of an instrument or a technique?”.
19 As I have mentioned, Kuhn (1977) listed five main characteristics of a good theory (or a paradigm).
However the theory (or the paradigm) here refers obviously to a disciplinary matrix rather than an exemplar.
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all, scientific practices in history. Therefore, I would reserve Kuhn’s idea that a key
constituent of an exemplar is a problem–solution. Furthermore, I argue that an exem-
plar as the fundamental unit shared by a scientific community should be more than a
problem–solution. A well-defined problem itself is at least as important as its solution
in the scientific practice. It also has as many normative functions as its solution does.
In the history of science, new research problems usually play a vital role to guide
the further practice, so the introduction of the new research problem itself is a great
scientific achievement. For instance, in On the Origins of Species, Charles Darwin
introduced many new research problems, which were never thought of or formulated
before, like “How will the struggle for existence… act in regard to variation? Can the
principle of selection, which we have seen is so potent in the hands of man, apply in
nature?” (Darwin 1859, p. 80). In addition, puzzle-solving and problem-defining are
two intertwined activities. As I shall show, an exemplary practice involves the mutu-
ally related activities of puzzle-solving and problem-defining. Moreover, it should be
noted that problem-defining is much more than proposing a problem. In fact it usually
consists of activities of problem-proposing (i.e. propose an initial problem), problem-
refining (i.e. refine an initial problem), and problem-specification (i.e. make an initial
problem into some more conceptually specific and experimentally testable problems).
The well-defined research problems should be an essential constituent of an exemplar.
Thus, my definition of exemplar is as follows:
An exemplar is a set of contextually well-defined research problems and the corre-
sponding solutions.
Firstly, I take an exemplar as a set of contextually well-defined research problems
and their solutions rather than a single problem and its solution. The reason is that
a set of contextually well-defined problems and their solutions can better reflect the
complex aspects of an exemplar as a scientific achievement. For example, we may argue
that the Morgan school’s research on Drosophila raises the problem of the patterns of
inheritance of Drosophila and its solution. However, in a finer-grained analysis, the
Morgan school’s research on Drosophila raises a set of well-defined research problems
(e.g. what is the expected distribution of phenotypes in a certain generation? What is
the probability that a particular phenotype will result from a certain mating? What is
the frequency of crossing over between two given loci in the chromosomes?) and their
solutions.
Secondly, the reason why I define an exemplar as a set of “contextually” well-
defined research problems and the corresponding successful solutions is that these
research problems can only be well-defined and understood in the context of their
solutions. In the process of constructing an exemplar, problem-defining and solution-
searching are not two independent activities. Rather these are two intertwined
activities. Solution-searching is obviously dependent on the research problem, while
the research problem can be redefined with the process of solution-searching such as
conceptualisation and hypothesisation.
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Thirdly, an exemplar should not be understood in a purely theoretical sense. No
exemplar can be constructed in an armchair. Any exemplar must have some non-
theoretical components.20
Thus, a naïve version of the exemplar-based approach can be formulated accord-
ingly as follows.
One should first analyse the history and practice of a science by identifying the
research problems. Then, one needs to analyse the solutions and practical efforts to
seek solutions, and then provide details about how they were applied to solve the
problems.
It is obvious that such an exemplar-based approach is still too vague to be helpful or
instructive in analysing the history and practice of science. Thus, I have to articulate
the components of the solutions of an exemplar in greater detail. However, it should
be noted that I do not think that the constituents of the solutions of an exemplar can
be characterised in a monistic way. Scientists solve the problems in different ways,
so it would be unwise for anyone to try to summarise some universally fundamental
parts in their solutions. Therefore, what I would provide is rather a common recipe of
an exemplar rather than a definition. By “a common recipe” I mean that an exemplar
usually, but not exclusively, consists in such and such components. Here is my common
recipe.
An exemplar has five main components: a vocabulary, which is a set of the concepts
employed in the problems and solutions; a set of well-defined research problems; a
set of practical guides, which specify all the procedures and methodology as means
to solve the problems; a set of hypotheses or models, which are proposed to solve
the problems; and a set of patterns of reasoning, which indicate how to use other
components to solve the problems.21
Three points have to be added here. Firstly, these five components are intertwined.
For instance, the hypotheses are often formulated on the basis of the results of the
experiments by employing the concepts in the vocabulary; the experiments are usu-
ally designed and undertaken with the purpose of solving the research problems (e.g.
by testing the hypotheses); the concepts in the vocabulary are understood with the
help of undertaking the experiments and applying the hypotheses, and so on. Sec-
ondly, the vocabulary of an exemplar does not suggest that all the concepts in the
vocabulary are first introduced by the exemplar, though it is not unusual that the
vocabulary of an exemplar has some pre-defined concepts. Thirdly, the hypotheses in
the exemplar should not be narrowly construed as statements or propositions. Rather
I refer to “hypotheses” as all kinds of theoretical constructions made by scientists.
In history, scientists use different terms to name this kind of work like “hypotheses”,
“assumptions”, “principles”, “laws”, “theories”, “models”, “mechanisms”, etc.
Thus, correspondingly, the construction of an exemplary practice is a series
of intertwined practices of experimentation, problem-defining, conceptualisation,
hypothesisation, and reasoning. Experimentation is the practice of designing and
20 The conception of exemplar is certainly applicable to many disciplines, including logic and mathematics.
But the one discussed in the paper is only applicable to the empirical sciences.
21 An example of the patterns of reasoning is the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) model of confirmation, which
applies an H-D model of logic to confirm a hypothesis by designing and undertaking the experiments.
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undertaking the experiments. Problem-defining is the practice of defining and redefin-
ing the research problems. Conceptualisation is the practice of introducing a new
conceptual scheme. Hypothesisation is the practice of theoretical construction to make
an explanatory and predictive machinery.22 Again, all these practices are intertwined
and cannot be understood as the independent activities of an exemplary practice.
Therefore, a common recipe for the exemplar-based approach can be summarised
as follows.
In order to analyse the history of the practice of a scientific school,23 we first should
identify the initial problem as the starting point of the research,24 and then trace the
way of solving the initial problem by identifying the actual problems to be investigated
and the way they occur in the practice, and analysing the process of problem-defining,
conceptualisation, experimentation, hypothesisation, and reasoning involved. Then,
we should detail the development of the intertwined practices in history to explore the
development of a school of scientific practice.
Before completing my articulation of exemplar and the exemplar-based approach, I
find one more problem, namely the problem of the reception of an exemplary practice,
to be articulated. Why are some exemplary practices successfully received, while oth-
ers totally neglected or abandoned after the acceptance in a period? What makes some
exemplary practices so successfully accepted? What are the characteristics shared by
those successfully accepted exemplary practices?
It is obvious that philosophy alone cannot provide the complete and comprehen-
sive answers to these questions. Why and when an exemplary practice is recognised
and well received by a community of scientists is complex and messy, both socio-
historiographically and philosophically. My interest here is not to attempt to look for
universal and comprehensive answers to these questions. Rather, I aim to identify
some intellectual characteristics shared by all well received exemplary practices in the
history of science, if there are. I propose that all successfully accepted exemplars share
(at least) two “intellectual” characteristics: repeatability and usefulness. A success-
fully accepted exemplary practice must be repeatable in the sense that all the practice
of problem-defining, experimentation, conceptualization, hypothesisation, and rea-
soning can be repeatedly manipulated. On the other hand, a successfully accepted
exemplary practice must be useful in the sense that some concepts in the vocabulary,
some hypotheses, some research problems, some practical guides, or some patterns
22 Note that I have to emphasise here that there is no universal account of theoretical construction. We have to
delve into the historical context to study the process of hypothesisation. For example. Some hypothesisaitons
are better characterised as modelling, while others are better as the discovery of mechanism.
23 I take a scientific school as a research community, which is similar to Kuhn’s paradigm (1970), Lakatos’
research programme (1978), Laudan’s research tradition (1977), and Massimi’s scientific perspective (2016).
Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian mechanics, and Mendelian genetics are good examples of scientific
schools.
24 Although I emphasised that one of the most important contributions of an exemplary practice is the
definition of research problems, it is unlikely for a scientist to begin his studies without an initial problem,
which was a well-defined research problem. These initial problems might not be interesting at all for the
subsequent development of the studies. A classical example is that the initial problem that inspired Morgan
to conduct experiments on Drosophila was in search for an experimental approach to evolution, but he
finally made a great achievement on solving the problems of Drosophila’s heredity. It is also likely that an
initial problem is re-formulated in new terms.
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of reasoning of the exemplary practice can be used as tools to solve other existing
problems or establish new exemplary practices. As Nickles (2012, p. 128) indicates,
“An exemplar candidate, like any tool, will gain status if it shows itself useful in
a variety of related situations.” It should be noted that repeatability and usefulness
are minimally necessary, rather than sufficient conditions of a successfully received
exemplary practice.
In summary, I define an exemplar as a set of contextually well-defined research
problems and the corresponding solutions, which consists of a vocabulary, a set of
well-defined research problems, a set of practical guides, a set of hypotheses or models,
and a set of patterns of reasoning. I also propose that the development of a school of
scientific practice can be analysed by identifying the initial research problem as the
starting point of the research, and by articulating the way of solving the initial problem
with the identification of the actual problems to be investigated and the way they occur
in the practice, and by analysing the process of problem-defining, conceptualisation,
experimentation, hypothesisation, and reasoning involved. In addition, repeatability
and usefulness are two characteristics of a good exemplary practice. In the next section,
I shall illustrate how this exemplar-based approach could be applied to analyse the
development and progress in the origin of genetics.
5 Case study: an exemplar-based account of the origin of genetics
Understanding the significance of Gregor Johann Mendel has been a persistent prob-
lem in the history and philosophy of biology: In what sense is Mendel the founder
of genetics? What did Mendel in fact contribute to the study of inheritance? What
contribution did Mendel make to the history of genetics? Thanks to many historians’
work (e.g. Brannigan 1979; Olby 1979; Callender 1988), the historiography of Mendel
today has been radically revised. It is now a consensus that Mendel’s concern was the
development of pea hybrids rather than the problem of heredity in general (Olby 1979;
Monaghan and Corcos 1990; Müller-Wille and Orel 2007). It is also accepted that the
great rediscovery of Mendel’s work in 1900 is in fact the introduction of Mendel’s
work into the study of heredity (Darden 1977; Olby 1985; Harwood 2000). Hugo
de Vries, Carl Correns, and Erich von Tschermak, the “rediscoverers” of Mendel’s
work in 1900, all differ in their research problems (Corcos and Monaghan 1985, 1987;
Monaghan and Corcos 1986). Therefore, the significance of Mendel in the history of
genetics is even more confusing: How does Mendel’s study on the development of
pea hybrids contribute to the study of inheritance? What is the best way to provide a
philosophical analysis of the “rediscovery” of Mendel’s work? In particular, there is
no plausible philosophical account of the origin of genetics, which is also compatible
with our current best historiography. In this section, I shall introduce an exemplar-
based account of the early development of genetics to show how the exemplar-based
approach as a case of reviving Kuhn’s legacy is helpful to contemporary philosophy
of science.
In his original paper, Mendel (1865, p. 3) is very explicit on his purpose of the study
of Pisum: to study the development of hybrids in their progeny. More specifically, the
initial research problem for Mendel is:
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MP1. How could one “determine the number of different forms in which hybrid
progeny appear, permit classification of these forms in each generation with certainty,
and ascertain their numerical interrelationship”? (Mendel 1865, p. 4).
In order to make MP1 more experimentally testable and conceptually more specific
problems for the further investigation, Mendel reformulates MP1 to a more specific
sub-problem:
MP2. What are the changes for each pair of differing traits, selected in the pre-
experiment practice, in the offspring of Pisum? Or, what is the law deducible from
the changes for each pair of differing traits selected in the successive generations?
(Mendel 1865, p. 7).
With contextually intertwined activities by problem-defining, conceptualisation,
experimentation, hypothesisation, and reasoning, Mendel established an exemplary
practice on the study of pea hybridisation, summarised in Table 1.
The significance of Mendel’s exemplary practice is to some extent overlooked until
it was adopted by de Vries in his study of pangenesis. De Vries’s initial problem (DP1)
is to experimentally test the principle (DH1) that the specific characters of organisms
are composed of distinct units (de Vries 1900a, b). It should be noted that DH1 is a
reformulated version of the hypothesis (DH1′) in the theory of pangenesis (1889) that
every hereditary characteristic has its special kind of pangen. De Vries had struggled
to find a way of analysing the data based on his hybridisation experiments until he
recognised that Mendel’s problem specification (MP1 → MP2), concepts of domi-
nance and recessiveness, and law of composition of hybrid fertilising cells (MH3) are
useful. By incorporating Mendel’s problem-defining, conceptualisation, and hypothe-
sisation, de Vries constructed an exemplary practice on the study of pangenesis, which
can be summarised as in Table 2.
Correns’ initial concern is the xenia question (CP1), that is, whether foreign pollen
has a direct influence on the characteristics of the fruit and seed. In 1896 he began
studying this problem in the case of Pisum. After reading Mendel’s paper, Correns
immediately recognised the relevance and usefulness of Mendel’s work. The purpose
of his 1900 paper is to test Mendel’s work on Pisum. Thus, CP1 is specialised into
another problem.
CP2. Is Mendel’s observation and the law on Pisum verifiable?
In order to test Mendel’s observation and analysis, Correns follows Mendel to focus
on a pair of differing traits. (CG1) In other words, a more specific problem occurs.
CP3. Is Mendel’s observation and law concerning a pair of differing traits confirmable?
Correns’ exemplary practice on testing Mendel’s study of Pisum can be summarised
in Table 3.
By analysing Mendel’s, de Vries’, and Correns’ exemplary practices, I argue that there
are four constituents of Mendel’s exemplary practice preserved (or preserved with
minor modifications) and passed on in the successors’ exemplary practices, despite
their different initial research problems. And all these constituents well account for
Mendel’s major contributions to the history of genetics, summarised by the historians.
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Table 3 Correns’ exemplary practice on Mendel’s Study of Pisum
Research
problems
Vocabulary Practical
guides
Hypotheses Experiments Patterns of
reasoning
CP1. Does foreign
pollen have a
direct influence
on the
characteristics
of the fruit and
seed?
CP2. Is Mendel’s
observation and
the law on
Pisum
verifiable?
CP3. Is Mendel’s
observation and
law concerning
a pair of
differing traits
confirmable?
CP4. Is Mendel’s
observation and
law concerning
two or more pair
of differing traits
confirmable?
CP4′. Is Mendel’s
LCD
confirmable?
CP5. Is Mendel’s
LCC universally
applicable?
Anlage
Dominating
trait (A)
Recessive trait
(a)
Dominating
anlage
Recessive
anlage
CG1 CH1. In the fusion of the
reproductive nuclei, the
anlage for the recessive
trait is suppressed by the
one for the dominating
trait. Prior to the
definitive formation of
the reproductive nuclei
a complete separation of
the two anlagen occurs,
so that one half of the
reproductive nuclei
receive the anlage for
the recessive trait, the
other half the anlage for
the dominating trait
CH2. In the hybrid,
reproductive cells are
produced in which the
anlagen for the
individual parental
characteristics are
contained in all possible
combinations, but both
anlagen for the same
pair of traits are never
combination. Each
combination occurs
with approximately the
same frequency
CE1
CE2
H-D
confirmation
First of all, as some historians (e.g. Olby 1979; Müller-Wille and Orel 2007) have
already pointed out, one of Mendel’s important achievements is that his approach to the
study of the problem of development by focusing on the paired traits in the successive
generations. Mendel’s important observations and hypotheses are all about paired traits
of hybrids and their progeny. This can be clearly illustrated as the problem-specification
(MP1 → MP2). As Müller-Wille and Orel (2007, p. 211) indicate, “Mendel’s focus
on character pairs was not only an important methodological step, but had immediate
consequences for his theorizing.” The significance of Mendel’s problem-specification
(MP1 → MP2) is also reflected in its reception at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Although de Vries, Correns, Tschermak, and Bateson were not studying
hybrid development, all of them adopted Mendel’s approach to concentrate on paired
traits. It is no surprise that de Vries’ problem-specification (DP1 → DP2) was indebted
to Mendel’s problem-specification (MP1 → MP2).
In every crossing experiment only a single character or a definite number of
them is to be taken into consideration… for experimental purposes the simplest
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conditions are presented by hybrids whose parents differ from each other in one
trait only (de Vries 1966, p. 108).
Tschermak (1900a) also adopted the Mendelian problem-specification to study his
research problem. In particular, Bateson is explicit on the point that a significant
lesson learnt from Mendel in the study of heredity is that of focusing on differing
traits.
[T]he subjects of experiment should be chosen in such a way as to bring the
laws of heredity to a real test. For this purpose the first essential is that the
differentiating characters should be few, and that all avoidable complications
should be got rid of. Each experiment should be reduced to its simplest possible
limits… [I]t is certain that by similar treatment our knowledge of heredity may
be rapidly extended (Bateson 1902, p. 16).
Thus, I argue that what de Vries, Correns, Teschermak, and Bateson in fact learnt from
Mendel here is a way of refining a general problem into a more specific one. Despite
beginning with different initial research problems, de Vries, Correns, and Bateson,
influenced by Mendel’s work (1865), all find that refining their initial problems into
a better defined and more narrowly scoped problem on paired traits is helpful in the
further investigation.
Another contribution of Mendel’s work is his exemplary use of the terms “dom-
inant” and “recessive” to conceptualise the paired traits and analyse the statistical
relation of them. Though the phenomenon of dominance had been observed by
many (e.g. Knight 1799; Goss 1824; Seton 1824) by the first half of the nineteenth
century, Mendel was the first to conceptualise the phenomenon in terms of domi-
nance/recessiveness, and record and analyse the statistical relation of dominant and
recessive traits. Mendel’s terminology was important for his work in the sense that
it lay down the conceptual foundation for his analysis of data, recognition of the
statistical regularity (e.g. the 3:1 ratio) and proposal of the hypotheses. It should be
highlighted that the significance of Mendel’s terminology and his statistical analysis
are intertwined. The statistical analysis cannot be made without the terms “dominant”
and “recessive”, while the introduction of the concepts of dominance and recessiveness
is not interesting if no statistical regularity is obtained.
Mendel’s terminology also enlightened the study of heredity around 1900. The
terms “dominant” and “recessive” were adopted by de Vries, Correns, Tschermak,
and Bateson, though their usages are different from Mendel’s in some respects (for a
summary, see Table 4). Correspondingly, the statistical analysis of the dominating and
recessive traits was also introduced into the study of heredity, especially by de Vries
(1900a, b, c) and Bateson (1902).
I have to emphasise that the concepts of dominance and recessiveness are important
in the origin of genetics because they are useful in conceptualisation, hypothesisation,
and idealisation rather than because they are essential conceptual components, which
are invariantly shared by both Mendel and the rediscoverers.
Thirdly, Mendel’s law of composition of hybrid fertilising cells (MH3) was also
particularly exemplary. What is really novel in Mendel’s MH3 is the correspondence of
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Table 4 Different usages of the term “dominating/recessiveness”
Dominating/recessiveness
Morphological traits Mendel, de Vries, Correns, Tschermak, Bateson
Morphological traits with a certain behaviour in
the progeny
Mendel
Hereditary characteristics De Vries
Hereditary material Correns, Bateson
the statistical relations of morphological traits and of germinal and pollen cells.25 The
morphological-cellular correspondence proposed by Mendel became a key to advance
the study of heredity three decades later. The biggest difficulty identified by Bateson
(1902) in the study of heredity at the turn of the twentieth century was the lack of a reli-
able approach to study the physical basis of heredity. In fact there were a few theories
of heredity concerning the physical basis. Weismann’s theory of germ-plasm (1892)
and de Vries’ theory of pangenesis (1889) are two representative ones. However, nei-
ther provided a feasible way to test the hypothesis. In particular, the relation of visible
characters and invisible “physical basis of heredity” is untestable experimentally. The
state of art of the study of heredity around 1900 is, as Bateson (1902, p. 3) neatly sum-
marises, “[n]o one has yet any suggestion, working hypothesis, or mental picture that
has thus far helped in the slightest degree to penetrate beyond what we see.” In 1900,
de Vries adopted and revised Mendel’s hypothesis on the morphological-cellular cor-
respondence to support his theory of pangenesis. In addition, de Vries also limited the
application of his trait-characteristics correspondence in the case of true hybrids. Cor-
rens made “a significant step beyond Mendel” by reformulating Mendel’s hypothesis
as a trait-anlage correspondence (CH1, CH2), though he was not clear on the impli-
cation of this reformulation in the study of heredity. Bateson was the first to make a
sophisticated attempt to incorporate Mendel’s morphological-cellular correspondence
with the study of heredity. Firstly, Bateson revised Mendel’s hypothesis as a trait-paired
allele determination. It is determination rather than correspondence, because Bateson
explicitly talked of “the bearers of the character”. Secondly, in contrast to the limited
applicability of Mendel’s correspondence, Bateson’s trait-paired alleles determina-
tion is applicable broadly in certain phenomena of alternative inheritance. Though
Mendel’s morphological-cellular correspondence was not adopted without modifica-
tion in de Vries’, Correns’, and Bateson’s work, it was really helpful to set out an
approach to work on the “inward and essential nature” of heredity.
Fourthly, Mendel’s other contribution to the study of heredity in 1900 is his exem-
plary mathematical approach. Mendel denotes the dominant (constant) trait A, the
hybrid trait Aa, the recessive (constant) trait a, and the distribution of these traits in
the F2 generation (A + 2Aa + a). All these symbolic notations are much more impor-
tant and useful than at first appears. All Mendel’s three laws can be formulated in the
equations in terms of these notations.
25 It is worth noting that correspondence is a weaker notion than determination. Mendel never used the
notion of determination, or causation in MH3.
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MH1: A + 2Aa + a
MH2: (A + 2Aa + a) (B + 2Bb + b)  AB + Ab + aB + 2ABb + 2aBb
+ 2AaB + 2AaB + 4AaBb
MH3:
A′
A′
+
A′
a′
+
A′
a′
+
a′
a′
 A + 2Aa + a
Moreover, Mendel’s MH1 and MH2 are introduced and articulated with the help of
these notations and the mathematical manipulation of these. Mendel’s mathematical
notation was also adopted and further developed by de Vries. The distribution of char-
acteristics in the F2 generation is formulated by de Vries as d2 + 2dr + r2. The move
from A + 2Aa + a to d2 + 2dr + r2 was a breakthrough in the history of genetics. The
equation (d + r)(d + r)  d2 + 2dr + r2 implicitly suggests the phenomenon of the sep-
aration of hereditary characteristics within pollen grains and ovules. This lays down
the cornerstone for a later conception of particulate inheritance. Mendel’s laws, and
the concepts of allelomorph (Bateson 1902, 1909), factor (Punnett 1905; Morgan et al.
1915), and gene (Morgan 1926) were all articulated with the help of similar notations.
Although, as many have pointed out, Mendel himself never had the conception of pairs
of hereditary elements determining the morphological trait, his mathematical approach
still played an indispensable role in the founding of genetics as a school of scientific
practice. Therefore, as I have shown, Mendel’s four significant contributions, namely,
the focus on a pair of differing traits, the conceptions of dominance and recessiveness
and their statistical relation, the morphological-cellular correspondence, and the math-
ematical approach, can be well accounted as problem-specification, conceptualisation,
and hypothesisation.
To sum up, I argue that Mendel’s contribution to the history of genetics is an
exemplary practice of the development of pea hybrids in their progeny. More specif-
ically, Mendel introduced a set of contextually well-defined research problems on
the development of hybrids in their progeny and the corresponding solutions, and
some components of his exemplary practice greatly inspired and influenced de Vries’,
Correns’, Tschermak’, and Bateson’s work, and lay down the cornerstone for the
study of heredity in the twentieth century. In particular, as I have argued earlier in
this section, Mendel’s focus on a pair of differing traits, the proposal of the concep-
tions of dominance and recessiveness and their statistical relation, the introduction
of the morphological-cellular correspondence, and his mathematical approach made
an enormous impact on de Vries’, Correns’ and Bateson’s’ work on heredity. Simi-
larly, de Vries’, Correns’, and Bateson’s contribution can also be characterised as the
exemplary practices, which also inspired and influenced the successors’ work (e.g.
Castle and Allen 1903; Castle 1903; Punnett 1905; Raynor and Doncaster 1905; Hurst
1906) on heredity in the first decade of the twentieth century. Therefore, the origin of
genetics from Mendel to Bateson, I argue, can be characterised as a chain of exemplary
practices.
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In the origin of genetics, the earlier exemplary practices are accepted and learnt by
the successor practitioners. It should be noted that to say that the practitioners accept an
exemplary practice does not mean that all the components of that exemplary practice
are accepted and shared dogmatically. Instead what is accepted and shared by all prac-
titioners is the way of defining the problems and of solving these problems. In the case
of the origin of genetics, what de Vries, Correns, Tschermak, and Bateson all shared
and accepted is Mendel’s problem-defining and problem-solving. Nevertheless, they
still differed in how to understand the components of Mendel’s exemplary practice
and how to use them (or some of them) to solve their problems. For the “rediscover-
ers”, Mendel’s conceptualisation, hypothesisation, experimentation, and reasoning are
just tools to solve Mendel’s problems, but some of the tools were useful to their own
research problems. Thus, Mendel’s vocabulary, hypotheses, practical guides, experi-
ments and patterns of reasoning are accepted as tools to solve Mendel’s problem of
hybrid development in their progeny and to solve successors’ problems. As I have
shown, the rediscoverers’ acceptance of Mendel’s exemplary practice is mainly due
to its repeatability and usefulness. In addition, to say that the exemplary practices are
accepted does not mean that they are accepted invariantly by all the late practitioners.
For example, it would be plausible to argue that de Vries and Bateson accepted and
worked on the basis of Mendel’s exemplar practice, while Hurst and Punnett accepted
and worked on the basis of Bateson’s exemplary practice rather than Mendel’s. This is
why I argue that the origin of genetics is better characterised as a chain of exemplary
practices rather than a set of exemplary practices.
To some extent, characterising Mendel’s contribution as the introduction of new
problems and their solutions is not a completely new idea. In particular, the signif-
icance of Mendel’s introduction of new research problems had been highlighted by
many historians (e.g. Sandler and Sandler 1985; Bowler 1989). In particular, Sandler
and Sandler (1985, p. 69) explicitly pointed out that “Mendel … defined his problem in
purely genetic terms, and produced a correct and amazingly complete answer.” How-
ever, one crucial difference between Sandlers’ and my interpretation is that Sandlers’
focus is mainly historical. Little is said about what the problem is and what the answer
is, or how the problem and its solution influence the successor’s work methodologi-
cally, conceptually, theoretically, etc. And this is what the reinterpretation of Kuhn’s
exemplar can contribute to examine these issues.
To sum up, so far I have argued that Mendel’s contribution can be characterised
as an introduction to new research problems and their corresponding solutions. The
origin of genetics from Mendel to Bateson26 is accordingly understood as a chain
of exemplary practices. This is a good example of how a reinterpretation of Kuhn’s
exemplar can be helpful in our understanding of scientific change and progress in the
history of science.
26 I have to emphasise that the origin of genetics from Mendel to Bateson discussed in this paper is definitely
not a complete and comprehensive picture of the origin of genetics. As the title of Olby’s book Origins
of Mendelism has suggested, there are multiple origins of genetics. What I focus on here is only one path
to genetics. More precisely speaking, my task is to explore a new exemplar-based way to analyse and
understand the development from Mendel’s (1865), de Vries’ (1900a, b, c), Correns’ (1900), Tschermak’s
(1900a, b) to Bateson’s work (1902).
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6 Conclusion
In summary, firstly I argue that Kuhn made two major novel contributions to the
philosophy of science in 1960s: the introduction of the conception of paradigm as an
alternative to theory to analyse and understand the practice and history of science; and
the proposal of the paradigm-based incommensurability thesis. Secondly, I argue that
Kuhn’s conceptual/terminological turn (from paradigm to theory) underlies the shift
of Kuhn’s focus upon the incommensurability from the semantic, methodological and
cognitive aspects to the semantic aspect only, and underlies the methodological turn
from a naturalistic approach and a priori approach. I thus argue that it is Kuhn’s failure
to explore and articulate his novel concept of paradigm as exemplar which makes the
incommensurability thesis less fruitful and plausible. Since the introduction of the
conception of exemplar is, as Kuhn himself recognizes, his most novel and important
contribution, I argue that it is also an important legacy for contemporary philosophy
of science. Finally, I have proposed a new interpretation of exemplar, and shown how
an exemplar-based approach can help to understand the development and progress in
the history of science. Along with Bird, I argue that there is still much more to do on
Kuhn’s legacy. Kuhn’s philosophy is not dead, and should not be dead.
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